Building Team Belay by Bernstein, Catherine P.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive





















Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 








Thesis Advisor:  Anders Strindberg 
Second Reader: Lars Hedström 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
September 2014 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
BUILDING TEAM BELAY 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S) Catherine P. Bernstein 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER  
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
 AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
Disaster responders are exposed to continuous periods of intense stress, and as a consequence, some suffer mental or 
emotional adverse effects. In recognition of critical stress as a valid concern, many emergency service providers have 
attempted, organizationally, to provide their responders with access to traditional critical stress interventions. But 
when a catastrophic event occurs and mutual aid is invoked, disaster workers and volunteers will respond from 
diverse jurisdictions, frequently without immediate access to the psychosocial assistance provided by their home 
agencies.  
 
It is incumbent upon incident commanders to be accountable for the psychosocial well-being of the disaster 
responders, just as it is their duty to ensure the physical safety of the responders under their command. However, our 
uniform organizational structure for disaster response, the National Incident Management System (NIMS), does not 
speak directly to the mental/emotional well-being of disaster responders. This thesis proposes interpreting NIMS and 
its supporting training modules so as to require a component to address disaster responder psychosocial resources. It 
further suggests that by leveraging precepts of social identity theory and concepts of swift trust, emergency 
operational team leaders may prime multi-jurisdictional responders to informal exchanges, fostering peer social 







14. SUBJECT TERMS Critical incident stress, resilience, swift trust, psychosocial, peer support, 
social identity. 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
77 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
BUILDING TEAM BELAY 
 
 
Catherine P. Bernstein 
 Senior Counsel, California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services 
B.S., California State University Northridge, 1983 
J.D., Southwestern University School of Law, 1986 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 


















Lars Hedström, Swedish National Defense College  





Chair, Department of National Security 
 iv




Disaster responders are exposed to continuous periods of intense stress, and as a 
consequence, some suffer mental or emotional adverse effects. In recognition of critical 
stress as a valid concern, many emergency service providers have attempted, 
organizationally, to provide their responders with access to traditional critical stress 
interventions. But when a catastrophic event occurs and mutual aid is invoked, disaster 
workers and volunteers will respond from diverse jurisdictions, frequently without 
immediate access to the psychosocial assistance provided by their home agencies.  
It is incumbent upon incident commanders to be accountable for the psychosocial 
well-being of the disaster responders, just as it is their duty to ensure the physical safety 
of the responders under their command. However, our uniform organizational structure 
for disaster response, the National Incident Management System (NIMS), does not speak 
directly to the mental/emotional well-being of disaster responders. This thesis proposes 
interpreting NIMS and its supporting training modules so as to require a component to 
address disaster responder psychosocial resources. It further suggests that by leveraging 
precepts of social identity theory and concepts of swift trust, emergency operational team 
leaders may prime multi-jurisdictional responders to informal exchanges, fostering peer 
social support, and enhancing responder resiliency to critical stress. 
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The vulnerability of disaster responders to critical stress has been well documented. 
Disaster responders are exposed to continuous periods of intense stress, and as a 
consequence, some suffer from its mentally or emotionally disruptive influence. In the 
United States, many emergency service providers have recognized disaster mental health 
as a valid concern and have attempted to address critical stress organizationally.  
However, when a catastrophic event occurs and mutual aid is invoked, disaster 
workers and volunteers will respond from diverse jurisdictions, frequently without 
immediate access to an employee assistance program or pastoral care. Moreover, due to 
the structure of mutual aid, emergency workers deployed as part of a multi-jurisdictional 
disaster response may find themselves working on operational teams with strangers. 
Many of these responders are away from home, away from their own social support 
system (family and friends), and without the informal peer-to-peer support of their own 
emergency response team members.  
It is incumbent upon emergency managers to be accountable for the psychosocial 
care of the disaster responders, just as it is their duty to ensure the physical safety of the 
responders under their command. However, our uniform organizational structure for 
disaster response, the National Incident Management System (NIMS), does not 
specifically attend to the mental/emotional well-being of disaster responders.  
This paper proposes interpreting NIMS and the training modules that support it to 
require a component to address disaster responder psychosocial care. Such an 
interpretation would be designed to secure the provision of critical stress interventions to 
emergency responders. This paper further suggests that by leveraging the precepts of 
social identity theory and swift trust, emergency managers, and perhaps other leaders in 
the homeland security enterprise, may be able to foster group identification amid 
temporary disaster response teams, prompting social support, a vital component to critical 
stress resilience.  
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I wish to thank the United States Naval Postgraduate School, Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security, for giving me the opportunity to participate in this 
incredible master’s degree program. Esteemed faculty, staff and classmates, you have my 
deepest gratitude and affection.  
I would like to express special thanks to my advisor, Anders Strindberg, for 
lending his incandescent intellect, gentle guidance and wonderful wit to this project. I 
wish to also thank my second reader, Lars Hedstrom, for generously sharing his time, 
consideration, experience and expertise.    
I gratefully acknowledge my mother and father for the values they instilled in me 
that prompted me to embark on this adventure and gave me the appreciation to relish it.  
I want to thank my husband, son and sister, for their loving support, and all they 
gave of themselves that made it possible for me to travel this magnificent journey. 
I wish to thank Col. Avery Kay, USAF (Ret), for his unflinching belief in me.  
This work is lovingly dedicated to Mum, the wind beneath my wings. 
 
 xvi




“It is not possible to ensure national security unless we secure the health 
of the workforce, and that includes mental health.”  
–Alexander Garza, assistant secretary for health affairs and chief 
medical officer, Department of Homeland Security, September 2011  
A. THE PROBLEM SPACE: DISASTER RESPONDER ACCESS TO 
PSYCHOSOCIAL RESOURCES 
As a corollary to their calling, disaster responders are exposed to continuous 
periods of intense stress.1 As a consequence, some disaster responders experience 
adverse physical and/or psychological effects. It is well documented that first responders 
and disaster workers are “at special risk for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and other 
negative emotional consequences of disaster.”2 The experience of these negative stress 
responses will be collectively referred to herein as “critical stress.”3 This paper focuses 
on the vulnerability of disaster responders to the injurious mental or emotional 
manifestations of critical stress and the possibility of enhancing responder resilience 
thereto by augmenting psychosocial resources.  
Many emergency service providers have recognized disaster mental health as a 
valid concern and have attempted to address critical stress organizationally. Traditionally, 
the military, many fire departments, and many law enforcement organizations have 
provided chaplains to support their personnel. Emergency services providers also 
                                                 
1 As used herein, “disaster responders” encompasses those workers and volunteers deployed to provide 
public safety services during the response phase of an emergency, including, but not limited to: urban 
search and rescue, medical services providers, firefighters, law enforcement, and military service personnel. 
2 Margaret Gibbs, and Kim Montagnino, “Disasters, A Psychological Perspective,” accessed 
November 24, 2012, http://www.training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/docs/EMT/GibbsPsychology.doc, 10. 
3 For purposes of this paper, the term “critical stress,” comprehends stress responses that manifest by 
the subject experiencing negative physical and/or psychopathological symptomology. For example, the 
appellation “critical stress,” as used herein, encompasses post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or any one 
the criteria that comprise a PTSD diagnosis, such as: “...re-experiencing the traumatic event, usually in 
flashbacks or nightmares; . . .avoidance of situations and stimuli that could reawaken the trauma, for 
example, numbing one’s feelings or withdrawing from others; and  . . . increased level of arousal, for 
instance, sleep difficulties, irritability, and concentration problems.” Gibbs and Montagnino, Disasters: A 
Psychological Perspective, 8. 
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maintain workers’ compensation health coverage for their employees, including resources 
for psychiatric assistance and employee assistance programs.4 
However, when a catastrophic event occurs and mutual aid is invoked, disaster 
workers and volunteers will respond from diverse jurisdictions, frequently without 
immediate access to an employee assistance program or pastoral care. Moreover, due to 
the structure of mutual aid, emergency workers deployed as part of a multi-jurisdictional 
disaster response may find themselves working on operational teams with strangers. 
Many of these responders are away from home, away from their own social support 
system (family and friends), and without the informal peer-to-peer support of their own 
emergency response team members.  
It is incumbent upon emergency managers to be accountable for the mental/
emotional well-being of the disaster responders, just as it is their duty to ensure the 
physical safety of the responders under their command. However, our uniform 
organizational structure for disaster response, the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS), does not speak directly to the mental/emotional well-being of disaster 
responders. This thesis proposes interpreting NIMS and its supporting training modules 
to require a component to address disaster responder psychosocial resources. It further 
explores resilience to critical stress and the interplay between resilience, social support, 
and social identity. It also probes the concept of swift trust in the context of temporary 
groups.  
The studies of social identity theory and swift trust examine the influences of 
social interaction upon group members’ motivational behavior and operational 
performance, respectively.5 Social identity theory elucidates individuals’ inherent need to 
“belong” and the psychological remunerations actuating one to conform to group mores.6 
                                                 
4 Institute of Medicine, Building a Resilient Workforce: Opportunities for the Department of 
Homeland Security: Workshop Summary (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2012).  
5 Henri Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982); Peder Hyllengren et al., “Swift Trust in Leaders in Temporary Military Groups,” Team Performance 
Management 17, no. 7/8 (2011): 354–368.  
6 S. Alexander Haslam, Anne O’Brien, Jolanda Jetten, Karine Vormedal, and Sally Penna, “Taking the 
Strain: Social Identity, Social Support, and the Experience of Stress,” British Journal of Social Psychology 
44, no. 3 (2005, September): 355–70, doi: 10.1348/014466605X37468. 
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Swift trust explores intra-group dynamics that contribute towards maximizing 
performance from temporary teams. This paper considers the hypothesis whether by 
leveraging notions of social identity theory and swift trust, emergency operational team 
leaders can “accelerate” group identity, priming temporary team members to social 
support.  
As a society, we owe a debt of gratitude to our service personnel, first responders, 
and civilian disaster workers. Heroes, they daily put their lives on the line for others. 
Poignantly, in return for their dedication and selflessness, too many of these men and 
women are harmed as a consequence of their service. Morally, for their sakes and the 
humanity whom they protect, the emergency management community should inquire into 
any means that may mitigate the damaging effects of the stress disaster responders endure 
as a result of their service. Moreover, for those who are persuaded by budgetary 
considerations, in light of the potential workers’ compensation liability, protecting the 
emotional/mental health of disaster responders is both fiscally responsible and prudent.7 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following reflects a literary exploration canvassing: 1) responder mental 
health needs; 2) the national policy pertaining thereto; 3) linking social support and 
resiliency; and 4) the potential for priming social support amid temporary disaster 
response teams using precepts of social identity theory and swift trust. 
1. The Vulnerability of Service Personnel, First Responders and Disaster 
Workers to Critical Stress 
There is an abundance of work validating the vulnerability of service personnel 
and first responders to critical stress. Much of the work has been written by individuals 
who have served as responders: fire fighters, emergency medical providers, law 
                                                 
7 Institute of Medicine, Building a Resilient Workforce, 130. 
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enforcement officers, members of armed forces, and disaster services workers.8 
Academicians and mental health professionals have also contributed significantly to the 
body of work that is available regarding first responder critical stress.9 The after effects 
of catastrophic incidents upon those responding to disasters have also been examined by 
numerous public service entities, such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Agency and the City of New York.10  
Less authoritative is the body of work created by those involved in the provision 
of critical stress services. Although these publications corroborate the critical stress 
experienced by responders, vendors and commercial providers author them. Because of 
this, articles of this genre can come across as vehicles for advertisement, which detracts 
from their sway.  
Taken as a whole, the materials reviewed authenticate the vulnerability of disaster 
responders to critical stress, the injury that can be occasioned by such stress, and the 
necessity of mitigating such harmful effects. In recognition that disaster responders are 
exposed to continuous periods of intense stress, and as a consequence, some suffer 
                                                 
8 Michael Byrne, “Alabama: When the Going Gets Tough, Even the Tough Seek Help,” June 17, 
2011, Federal Emergency Management Agency, https://www.fema.gov/blog/2011-06-17/alabama-when-
going-gets-tough-even-tough-seek-help; Steven Chumley, “The Best Approach to Crisis Intervention” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012); “Peer Support at Ground Zero: Interview with 
Engineer Ann Peggs,” International Association of Women in Fire and Emergency Services, 2002, 
http://www.i-women.org/archive_articles.php?article=9.  
9 David Alexander, C. Psychol, and Susan Klein. “First Responders after Disasters: A Review of 
Stress Reactions, At-Risk, Vulnerability, and Resilience Factors,” Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, 24, 
no. 2 (2009): 87–94, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid= 
ECE40881C924F9594208A5453A2EAA17?doi=10.1.1.176.1579&rep=rep1&type=pdf; Charles R. 
Marmar et al., “Predictors of Posttraumatic Stress in Police and Other First Responders.” Annals of the 
New York Academy of Sciences 1071, no. 1 (July 1, 2006): 1–18; Kathy D. McKoy, “The Impact of Stress 
on First Responders: A Phenomenological Study,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Capella University, 2010); New 
Jersey Center for Public Health Preparedness at the University of Medicine & Dentistry New Jersey, “First 
Responders Self Care, Wellness, Health, Resilience and Recovery Dealing with Stress,” September 1, 
2005, www.njcphp.org/legacy/drup/index.php?q=node/115; Lainie Rutkow, Lance Gable, and Jonathan M. 
Links, “Protecting the Mental Health of First Responders: Legal and Ethical Considerations,” Journal of 
Law, Medicine & Ethics 39 (2011): 56–59; Scott Tracy, “How Cumulative Stress Affected the Lived 
Experience of Emergency Medical Service Workers after a Horrific Natural Disaster: Implications for 
Professional Counselors,” Ph.D. dissertation, Duquesne University, 2007). 
10 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [USDHHS], A Guide to Managing Stress in Crisis 
Response Professions (DHSS Pub. No. SMA 4113) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2005); Hilary Zelko, On the Front Line: The Work of First Responders in a Post 9/11 
World (Ithaca, NY: Smithers Institute School of Industrial & Labor Relations, Cornell University, 2004); 
New York City, “9/11 Health: Rescue and Recovery Workers—What We Know,” 2012, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html//doh/wtc/html/rescue/know.shtml. 
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mental or emotional adverse effects, many emergency service providers are attempting to 
address critical stress at an organizational level. However, there is debate within the 
emergency response community as to the appropriate method(s) for responding to critical 
stress. This debate is reflected throughout the field’s topical literature.11 This thesis will 
not endeavor to weigh in on the dispute. No attempt is made herein to assess best 
practices amongst conventional interventions. Rather, what is taken from an overview of 
the various schools of thought is that they universally acknowledge the significance of 
providing responders access to critical stress interventions and psychosocial resources. 
Appreciating that psychosocial resources are vital to disaster responders is a first step 
towards positing their augmentation.  
2. Current Principles and Policy: National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health, U.S. National Response Team, RAND 
Recommendations, and the National Incident Management System 
The Emergency Responder Health Monitoring and Surveillance (ERHMS) system 
emanates from efforts of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) working collectively with the U.S. National Response Team (NRT) and a 
number of federal agencies, state health departments, labor unions, and volunteer 
emergency responder groups. The ERHMS system is comprised in two publications, the 
ERHMS Technical Assistance Document and the ERHMS A Guide for Key Decision 
Makers, which provide a schematic for emergency managers to track disaster responder 
health and safety.12    
The purpose of the EHRMS Technical Assistance Document is “to provide a 
recommended health monitoring and surveillance framework, . . . which includes specific 
recommendations and tools for all phases of a response, including the pre-deployment, 
                                                 
11 One school advocates critical incident stress management while another school avers that the 
benefits of critical incident stress debriefing are questionable at best= and possibly harmful to the 
participants. Still other experts are proponents of “psychological first aid.” Recent literature also discourses 
upon employing chaplains and peer-to-peer support as critical incident stress intervention resources. 
12 U.S. National Response Team, Emergency Responder Health Monitoring and Surveillance: A Guide 
for Key Decision Makers (Washington, DC: U.S. National Response Team, 2012).  
U.S. National Response Team, Emergency Responder Health Monitoring and Surveillance, Technical 
Assistance Document (Washington, DC: U.S. National Response Team, 2012).  
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deployment, and post-deployment phases.”13 The design of medical monitoring and 
surveillance is to gather crucial information to focus risk prevention and mitigation 
efforts and to identify which responders would benefit from post-deployment referral. In 
sum, the EHRMS is about collecting information to trigger and support decisions to take 
safety actions for responders (control measures).  
While offering much detail as to how responder health surveillance and 
monitoring may be conducted, the EHRMS does not dictate how responder agencies are 
to act upon the data thus accumulated. The mechanics of carrying out prevention and 
mitigation measures are left to the devices of the various response agencies attempting to 
follow the guidelines. In this way, the Technical Assistance Document can be likened to a 
simple smoke detection device. A basic smoke detector will give the alert that conditions 
are present consistent with fire, thereby providing vital, possibly lifesaving information. 
But a detector alone will not direct the occupants how to react (evacuate, call fire 
department, put out the fire). Those who are alerted must have and carry out a response 
plan. By the same token, the EHRMS can assist responder agencies to recognize when a 
mental health intervention is indicated. But the emergency management community must 
have command of resources to provide the appropriate aid.  
The EHRMS is a valuable work in that it provides essential tools for assessing 
responder health. In doing so, ERHMS implicitly concurs with the principle that the 
emergency management community’s responsibility to disaster responders extends to 
their mental/emotional well-being. But the ERHMS’s sparse comments with regard to 
responder “emotional health status,” while alluding to the issue of psychological well-
being and “psychological toxins,” provides little pragmatic substance for delivery of 
responder psychosocial resources.14  
A prior study conducted by the NIOSH in conjunction with RAND, Protecting 
Emergency Responders, Volume 3, Safety Management in Disaster and Terrorism 
Response, includes within its recommendations that the emergency management 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 U.S. National Response Team, Emergency Responder Health Monitoring and Surveillance, 
Technical Assistance Document, 6–7. 
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community, “Protect the Mental Health of the Response Workforce by Managing Critical 
Incident Stress.”15  
Regrettably, the structure of NIMS is currently not interpreted to effectuate the 
ERHMS’s intent with regard to the potential mental health needs of responders. Nor is 
there any mechanism within NIMS for either development or implementation of the 
NOISH/RAND recommendation to protect the mental health of the response workforce. 
The framework of NIMS and the training modules that support it do not directly speak to 
the mental/emotional well-being of disaster responders.16 
ERHMS avers its intention to be consistent with the National Incident 
Management System. This paper will propose that a necessary step to carrying out the 
purport of the EHRMS is interpreting the National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
to encompass responder emotional/mental health. Such an interpretation will comport 
with both the EHRMS and the NOISH/RAND recommendations. When NIMS is so 
interpreted, the responsibility for provision of responder psychosocial resources will be 
vested with the incident command.17 Emergency managers will necessarily be provided 
training regarding mental health risks and acquainted with services available to support 
the responders. In this way, when EHRMS detects a need for a mental health 
intervention, emergency management will have command of the tools needed to respond, 
and the NOISH/RAND recommendation to protect the mental health of the response 
workforce can be realized. 
                                                 
15 Brian A. Jackson, Protecting Emergency Responders, Vol 3, Safety Management in Disaster and 
Terrorism Response (RAND Publication No. MG-170) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Science and 
Technology Policy Institute and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2004), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG170.html.  
16 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Appendix B,” in National Incident Management System 
(Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008). 
17 Both the ERHMS and the NOISH/RAND recommendations place responsibility for responder 
health with the safety officer within incident command, in coordination with the medical unit if there be 
one.  
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3. Linking Social Support and Resiliency 
The latest trend for addressing the exposure of service personnel to critical stress 
has been a move towards building individual resilience.18 As part of the Department of 
Defense’s Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, the California National Guard (CNG) has 
recently incorporated a resilience component to its training. Developed by the University 
of Pennsylvania, the CNG Master Resilience Training Program is designed to promote 
greater resilience in CNG personnel. The competencies strengthened through the training 
are calculated to mitigate the adverse emotional and mental impressions of critical stress. 
Without abandoning traditional interventions, such as counseling, chaplaincy, and peer-
to-peer support, the body of work reflected in the training is geared towards prevention/
mitigation and represents the most contemporary thinking in the field.  
Material to this thesis is the Master Resilience Program’s corroboration of two 
interrelated propositions: 1) the plausibility of mitigating the adverse effects of stress by 
enhancing resilience; and 2) that social support can beneficially contribute to resilience. 
Upon these premises, the thesis will posit enhancing resilience to critical stress, by 
fostering social support.  
But the Master Resilience Program is just one example of a prevalent theme 
within the military and emergency management communities building resilience as a 
strategy for mitigating risk of harm caused by stressors. In 2012, the Institute of Medicine 
published its report, Building a Resilient Workforce: Opportunities for the Department of 
Homeland Security: Workshop Summary. That study was supported by collaboration 
between the National Academy of Sciences and the Department of Homeland Security. It 
examines factors influencing workplace effectiveness and resilience, reviews resilience 
programs and interventions, and explores the interplay between individual and 
organizational resilience and performance measures.  
What gives the Institute of Medicine’s report its heft are the pedigrees of the 
contributors. The impressive assembly includes scholars and professionals who advance 
their opinions from first-hand observations of real-world experiences and disaster 
                                                 
18 Institute of Medicine, Building a Resilient Workforce. 
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responses. This report authenticates several things: 1) that disaster workers are exposed to 
extreme stressors, and as a consequence, some experience negative effects of critical 
stress; 2) that building resilience is a valid mitigating strategy to address critical stress; 
and 3) that social support is recognized as contributing to resilience.19  
Among contemporary writings expounding upon social support and resilience is a 
white paper published in 2011 by the Defense Centers of Excellence, Identification of 
Best Practices in Peer Support Programs: White Paper. Providing a comprehensive and 
objective analysis of peer-to-peer programs, the white paper reiterates, “Strong social 
support networks have been linked to resilience, which is fundamental component of 
successfully managing stress.”20 Defining peer support as “assistance provided by a 
person who shares commonalities with the target population . . .” the analysis highlights 
the special effectiveness of programs that are able to leverage the benefits from the 
“uniqueness of peer status.”21  
The study validates that the potency of “uniform-to-uniform” dialogue is the 
capacity for peers to provide “emotional support, information and advice, practical 
assistance, and help in understanding or interpreting events [emphasis added].”22 The 
work’s illumination of peer social support is central to the instant thesis, because it 
corroborates the nexus between social identification, social support and resilience. 
4. The Potential for Priming Social Support amid Temporary Disaster 
Response Teams Using Precepts of Social Identity Theory and Swift 
Trust  
A seminal work in its field, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations canvases the 
precepts of social identity theory.23 The publication, meticulously compiled and edited by 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Nisha Money, Monique Moore, David Brown, Kathleen Kasper, Jessica Roeder, Paul Bartone, 
Mark Bates, Best Practices Identified for Peer Support Programs, Defense Centers of Excellence for 
Psychological Health & Traumatic Brain Injury, 2011, http://www.dcoe.mil/content/Navigation/
Documents/Best_Practices_Identified_for_Peer_Support_Programs_Jan_2011.pdf, 4. 
21 Ibid., 14. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations.  
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Henri Tajfel, explores how identifying oneself as being a part of a group can provide 
positive value to an individual’s sense of self.  
In the context of homeland security, a growing body of work uses social identity 
theory as an analytical tool to explain what motivates individuals to conform to group 
mores and actuates them to extremism.24 This construct superimposes Tajfel’s theoretical 
framework to the architecture of radicalization, recruitment, and targeting by terrorist 
organizations. 
In Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, Fathali M. Moghaddam expands 
upon the work of Tajfel and psychologist Muzafer Sherif and discourses upon the 
concept of superordinate goals. The concept of superordinate goals proposes “under 
certain conditions group members come to perceive themselves as belonging to 
subgroups encompassed by a superordinate group identity.”25 The concept of the 
superordinate group identity is crucial to the instant effort because a characteristic of 
disaster response work is the need for a multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional response.26 
When disaster response teams are assembled from diverse responding agencies, a team’s 
ability to see its collective roll in the overall operation and to form a superordinate group 
with a shared social identity may be a key to its potentiality for social support.  
S. Alexander Haslam has conducted studies and authored a body of work 
exploring the role social identity theory and self-categorization play in structuring 
people’s experience of stress and hence their stress outcomes. In “Taking the Strain: 
Social Identity, Social Support, and the Experience of Stress,” the findings of Haslam and 
his co-authors provide support for the following: 1) That social identification is 
associated with perceptions of social support and reduced stress. 2) That the relationship 
between social identification and stress is mediated by social support. 3) The experience 
                                                 
24 Seth J. Schwartz, Curtis S. Dunkel, and Alan S. Waterman, “Terrorism: An Identity Theory 
Perspective,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 6 (2009): 537–559; David W. Brannan, Kristin 
Darken and Anders Strindberg, The Practitioner’s Way Forward: Terrorism Analysis (Salinas, CA: Agile 
Press, 2014).  
25 Fathali M. Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for 
Democracy in Global Context (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2008), 102. 
26 Douglas Paton and John M. Violani, “Terrorism Risk Assessment and Management,” in Psychology 
of Terrorism, ed. Bruce Bongar et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 237.  
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of beneficial social support is more likely to occur to the extent that individuals are 
socially identified with those in a position to provide support.27  
The findings of Haslam and his co-authors suggest,  
Social support is not a free-floating variable that is visited at random on 
particular individuals. Instead, it is highly correlated with social 
identification, suggesting that people only perceive and only receive 
social support when they sense that they share self-defining group 
membership with those in a position to provide it [emphasis added].28  
The work of Haslam et al. establishes premises that are foundational to the 
hypothesis posed by this paper. Their conclusions build a triangle linking social 
identification with social support and social support with reduced stress. From these 
premises, this thesis will postulate whether fostering social identification within a disaster 
response work group will prime social support, which in turn can enhance resilience.  
Note must be made that amidst the literature reviewed and in the context of 
responder stressors, one work remarked on a potential untoward effect of social 
identification. In “Terrorism Stress Risk Management,” Paton and Violanti suggest that 
team cohesiveness could contribute to vulnerability, “if situational constraints result in a 
response being perceived as less effective than anticipated.”29 However, the authors do 
not advance that this possible disadvantageous prospect of social identification outweighs 
the benefits to be derived from social support.  
The bodies of work examining the links between resilience and social support and 
social support and social identification have not, thus far, focused upon temporary teams. 
Temporary systems have been defined as “a set of diversely skilled people, working 
together on a complex task over a limited period of time.”30 It is intriguing that 
“temporary groups display behaviors that presuppose trust, although they do not have a 
                                                 
27 Haslam et al., “Taking the Strain.” 
28 Ibid. 366. 
29 Paton and Violani, “Terrorism Risk Assessment and Management,” 241.  
30 Richard A. Goodman and Lawrence P. Goodman, “Some Management Issues in Temporary 
Systems: a Study of Professional Development and Manpower: The Theater Case,” Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 21 no. 3, (1976): 494–50 quoted in Hyllengren et al., “Swift Trust in Leaders in Temporary 
Military Groups,” 355.  
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history of trust development.”31 Meyerson et al. evolved the definition of temporary 
systems, “listing nine characteristics that define temporary systems, which have the 
potential to develop trust:  
1) Participants with diverse skills are assembled by a contractor to enact 
expertise they already possess;  
2) Participants have a limited history of working together;  
3) Participants have limited prospects of working together again in the future;  
4) Participants are often part of limited labor pools and overlapping 
networks;  
5) Tasks are often complex and involve interdependent work;  
6) Tasks have a deadline;  
7) Assigned tasks are non-routine and not well understood; 
8) Assigned tasks are consequential; and  
9) Continuous interrelating is required to produce an outcome.”32 
The group dynamics of temporary systems are of significance to this investigation 
because disaster responses necessitate the formation of temporary work groups. And it is 
the apparent gap in access to psychosocial resources suffered by multi-jurisdictional 
responders assigned to temporary workgroups that this paper seeks to address.  
An aspect of temporary teams that has been subject of inquiry is “swift trust,” a 
form of trust that may be cultivated in organizations that have not had time to develop 
trust in traditional ways.33 Swift trust has been defined as “a unique form of trust that 
occurs between groups or individuals brought together in temporary teams to accomplish 
specific tasks, often under time constraints.”34 The preponderance of literature pertaining 
to swift trust expatiates upon its application to temporary teams, most commonly in the 
information technology sector and its efficacy for enhancing team performance.  
                                                 
31 Hyllengren et al., “Swift Trust in Leaders in Temporary Military Groups,” 355.  
32 Debra Meyerson, Karl E. Weick and Roderick M. Kramer “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” in 
Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research, ed., Roderick M. Kramer and Tom R. Tyler 
(SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1996), 165–95 quoted in Hyllengren et al., “Swift Trust in 
Leaders in Temporary Military Groups,” 355. 
33 Hyllengren et al., “Swift Trust in Leaders in Temporary Military Groups,” 355. 
34 Michael J. Fahy, “Understanding Swift Trust to Improve Interagency Collaboration in New York 
City” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 4. 
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However, in 2011, Team Performance Management published a pivotal study, 
“Swift Trust in Leaders in Temporary Military Groups,” by Peder Hyllengren, Gerry 
Larsson, Maria Fors and Misa Sjoberg, of the Swedish National Defense College, Jarle 
Eid of University of Bergen, and Olav Kjellevold Olsen of Royal Norwegian Naval 
Academy.35 This work culminates in a hierarchical model of characteristics that 
contribute to development of swift trust (or the lack thereof) in military leaders. The 
model is presented in terms of two superior categories, “individual-related 
characteristics” and “relationship-related characteristics.”36 The former category focuses 
upon the personal attributes and competencies of the leader. Relationship-related 
characteristics include communication/social skills, leadership, and management. It is 
within these later categories that building blocks for fostering swift trust are identified. 
These may collaterally encourage team identity including: “create common goals in the 
group,” “sees the whole picture,” “support/empathy,” “social smoothness,” “presence,” 
and “alikeness.”37  
In his thesis, “Understanding Swift Trust to Improve Interagency Collaboration in 
New York City,” Michael J. Fahy posits whether swift trust could enhance inter-agency 
collaboration between the New York Police Department (NYPD) and the New York City 
Fire Department (FDNY).38 Examined in the context of first responders, Fahy’s inquiry 
follows the course of other analyses and evaluates the influence of swift trust (or lack 
thereof) upon team performance. Much of Fahy’s focus is upon the interplay between 
swift trust and collaboration. His conclusion is that while the development of swift trust 
between NYPD and FDNY would be beneficial to both, there are still cultural and 
operative barriers retarding the establishment of swift trust between these two groups of 
responders. He also remarks that current training (for NYPD and FDNY) is largely 
ineffective at developing interagency swift trust.  
                                                 
35 Hyllengren et al., “Swift Trust in Leaders in Temporary Military Groups,” 355. 
36 Ibid., 361. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Fahy, “Understanding Swift Trust.” 
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It must be kept in mind that Fahy’s work studied the potential for inter-agency 
swift trust between groups to enhance operational efficacy on cooperative efforts. His 
conclusions regarding hurdles to the development of inter-agency swift trust, 
organizational and cultural barriers, reflect group characteristics. Expounding upon Chief 
Joe Dugan’s analysis of New York City’s Urban Search and Rescue Team, New York 
Task Force 1 (NY-TF1), Fahy also tests the application of swift trust to formation of 
combined, temporary teams (members from two in-groups re-configuring to work as 
one).39 Exploring the training and operations of the NY-TF1, Fahy’s analysis continues 
highlighting organizational factors, as opposed to personal factors, which can contribute 
to swift trust enhancing the combined team’s operational capability. Significantly, Fahy 
concludes, “As part of the strategy to develop swift trust and improve collaboration, 
emergency responders from all agencies must begin to view themselves as part of a 
team.”40 
Fahy’s work sets the stage for hypothesizing whether swift trust can be equated 
with or transmuted into “accelerating” group identity within a temporary team. Will the 
dynamics Fahy discourses as inhibiting the formation of swift trust between groups 
likewise thwart the formation of group social identity? Or can team leaders encourage 
temporary team members from different jurisdictions to view themselves as part of a 
superordinate team? And if group identity can be “accelerated,” will it prime temporary 
team members to resilience-enhancing social support in the same manner that swift trust 
contributes team collaboration? 
5. Conclusion  
A possible impediment to the emergency management community’s acceptance 
of a construction of the National Incident Management System that requires a component 
to address disaster responder psychosocial resources may be a misconception that such an 
interpretation would embrace additional liability. On the contrary, such an endeavor, 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 51–52. 
40 Ibid., 64. 
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aimed at mitigating the damaging effects of critical stress inherent to disaster response 
work, should lessen workers’ compensation and disability claims.  
Much has been written about critical stress and first responders that expounds on 
the vulnerability of disaster workers to being adversely impacted by the extreme stressors 
they encounter. A substantial portion of the literature discoursing critical stress 
interventions debates best practices. This thesis does not endeavor to reach any 
conclusions with regard to the efficacy of one method over another. What is taken from 
an overview of the various schools of thought is that they universally acknowledge the 
significance of providing responders access to critical stress interventions and 
psychosocial resources.  
“Resilience” is the latest buzzword for addressing critical stress of service 
personnel. Methods for building personal resilience are being implemented by our armed 
forces. The body of work exploring this subtopic conveys greater credence because its 
sponsorship originates with the military and other governmental entities.  
The phenomenon of swift trust, cultivated within the information technology 
sector to form effective temporary work teams, has been analyzed for application to 
military leaders and evaluated as a potential tool for honing interoperability between 
groups of responders. The works exploring the dynamics of swift trust have focused upon 
its efficacy in terms of improving team collaboration and performance. Still to be 
investigated is whether group identity in temporary systems can be “accelerated” to foster 
social support (a key contributor to individual resiliency).  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Object of Study 
This study focuses upon the current framework of the Incident Command System 
(ICS) within the National Incident Management System (NIMS) that provides for disaster 
responder physical safety. The object of this study is the adequacy of the NIMS structure 
to address disaster responder psychosocial well-being.  
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The thesis further examines the correlation between social support and resilience. 
It also explores the factors that encourage swift trust in temporary systems and how swift 
trust contributes to collaboration and performance. Suggesting the possibility that group 
identity might be “accelerated” in disaster work groups, in the manner that swift trust is 
developed in temporary teams, this work posits whether “accelerated” group identity 
would be calculated to foster social support.  
2. Rationale 
NIMS dictates a uniform organizational structure for disaster response. Pursuant 
to NIMS, it is the duty of emergency managers to ensure the physical safety of the 
responders under their command; however, NIMS does not directly speak to the 
psychosocial well-being of the disaster workers.41 Individual emergency response 
organizations may provide for responder mental/emotional health support, but such 
assistance may be limited to local availability. Mutual aid disaster responders from 
diverse jurisdictions can be exposed to continuous, intense stress while distanced from 
the support of family and friends, employer provided counseling, pastoral care, and their 
own “home team” of peers. Social support is a vital component of resilience. In 
temporary systems, swift trust, which requires group identity, contributes towards 
collaboration and team performance. If group identity can be “accelerated” in temporary 
disaster teams in the manner akin to swift trust, perhaps a collateral benefit would be 
augmented social support.  
3. Data Sources 
Data has been gathered from a range of secondary sources: policies and guidelines 
of the United States; governmental and academic literature, including studies and reports 
from prior mutual aid disaster responses, and review of the practices of individual 
emergency response organizations with respect to providing mental/emotional health 
support for responders; literature correlating social support to personal resiliency; and 
literature elucidating the precepts of social identity theory and swift trust.  
                                                 
41 National Incident Management System, Department of Homeland Security 2008, 52 and Appendix 
B: Incident Command System, 93–94, www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf. 
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4. Type and Mode of Analysis 
The policy analysis will briefly define the problem, select criteria by which to 
judge existing policy, and propose a solution.  
(1) The Problem 
The absence of specificity within NIMS for addressing responder psychosocial 
well-being is problematical given the documented vulnerability of disaster responders to 
adverse mental or emotional impacts of critical stress. The predicament is compounded 
by the confluence of circumstances, which can result in mutual aid responders being 
distanced from traditional critical stress intervention resources and social support.  
(2) Criteria by Which Existing Policy is Judged 
This work examines the emergency management community’s principles and 
policy pertaining to the protection of responder psychosocial well-being as articulated by 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the Emergency Responder Health 
Monitoring and Surveillance (ERHMS) system, and the recommendations issued by the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOHS) and RAND. This study 
further explores the potentiality for impediments to disaster responders accessing 
psychosocial resources during multi-jurisdictional responses. Moreover, it examines 
literature pertaining to resilience and social support and studies into social identity theory 
and swift trust. From that analysis, the thesis will postulate whether “accelerating” group 
identity could foster social support in temporary teams.  
(3) Recommendations for Improving Existing Policy and a Strategy for 
Implementation 
This thesis proposes interpreting NIMS and the training modules that support it to 
require a component that addresses disaster responder psychosocial well-being. The 
CDC, NIOSH, U.S. NRT have developed ERHMS, a system for emergency responder 
health monitoring and surveillance. Implicitly ERHMS is intended to include responder 
mental health. In an extensive white paper, RAND has recommended building an 
integrated safety function into the Incident Command System, under the auspices of the 
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safety officer.42 This thesis suggests that implementation of the recommendations of 
RAND pertaining to responder mental health, echoed in the ERHMS are suitably 
encompassed within the purview of the safety officer. This work recommends 
development of a training module for emergency responder team leaders that would 
leverage the precepts of social identity theory and swift trust amongst mutual aid/multi-
jurisdictional operational teams to foster peer social support. It further proposes creation 
of a pilot project implementing such a training program among urban search and rescue 
emergency managers.  
5. Output 
The analysis should confirm or refute the value of interpreting NIMS including 
assignment of responsibility for the mental/emotional well-being of disaster responders. 
The analysis should further support or abrogate investing resources towards developing 
“accelerated” group identity amongst mutual aid responders.  
D. BUILDING TEAM BELAY 
Belay: verb \bi-ˈlā,\ : to attach (a rope) to something so that it is secure : to 
attach a secure rope to (a person) for safety. 
Belay: noun \bi-ˈlā,\: the securing of a person or a safety rope to an anchor 
point (as during mountain climbing); also : a method of so securing a 
person or rope.43 
Disaster responders are exposed to continuous periods of intense stress, and as a 
consequence, some suffer mental or emotional adverse effects. Many emergency service 
providers, recognizing critical stress as a valid concern, organizationally attempt to offer 
their responders access to traditional critical stress interventions. But when a catastrophic 
event occurs, and mutual aid is invoked, disaster workers and volunteers will respond 
from diverse jurisdictions, frequently without immediate access to the psychosocial 
assistance provided by their home agencies.  
                                                 
42 Jackson et al., Protecting Emergency Responders. 
43 Merriam Webster, s.v. “belay,” accessed May 5, 2014, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/belay. 
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Our uniform organizational structure for disaster response, the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) is ambiguous with respect to the mental/emotional well-
being of disaster responders. Because disaster responders, assembling from diverse 
jurisdictions to render aid, are often distanced from conventional critical stress 
interventions and traditional sources of social support they are, metaphorically, rappelling 
off an emotional cliff; the conditions they must witness and endure put them at risk of 
psychological free fall. The proposed “rigging” of informal peer exchanges amongst 
multi-jurisdictional operational teams, utilizing devices of swift trust to improvise social 
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II. MENTAL HEALTH AS AN ELEMENT OF RESPONDER 
SAFETY: WHERE PROBLEM, PRINCIPLES AND POLICY MEET 
ON THE PRECIPICE OF A PRACTICAL GAP 
Disaster responders are witness to horrific scenes.44 Heroically, they answer 
humanity’s cries for help, bent upon relieving the devastation wrought by natural and 
man-caused disasters. Their call to service can immerse them in the aftermath of every 
imaginable and unthinkable catastrophe: tornadoes, hurricanes, tsunamis, earthquakes, 
mass casualty accidents, and terrorist attack, any agent by which mayhem can descend 
upon a populace. For weeks, sometimes months on end, they live and work amidst the 
wreckage, death and destruction such calamities leave in their wake. The worst of what 
emergency personnel have seen and smelled and the duties they have had to perform is 
rarely shared outside the disaster response community with loved ones or “civilian” 
friends. The images are too horrible.  
But this valor comes at a tremendous cost. What has been learned from studies of 
those who responded to catastrophic events, such as 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and the 
Oklahoma City Bombing, is that the conditions disaster workers must endure can have 
negative psychological influence.45 Pursuant to contemporary principles, emergency 
agencies, most commonly at the local level, are attempting to address the psychosocial 
needs of responders. However, as it is presently interpreted, national emergency 
management policy is not keeping pace with current guidelines and recommendations. In 
combination with the policy’s ambiguity, a confluence of cultural and circumstantial 
barriers can cause a practical gap in access to psychosocial resources for disaster 
responders.  
                                                 
44 Alexander, Psychol, and Klein. “First Responders after Disasters.” 
45 Jackson et al., Protecting Emergency Responders. 
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A. DISASTER RESPONDERS ARE EXPOSED TO CONTINUOUS INTENSE 
STRESSORS, AND AS A CONSEQUENCE, SOME EXPERIENCE 
NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF CRITICAL STRESS 
Emergency workers, who are responding to assist at the scenes of natural and 
man-caused disasters, can be assailed by a cacophony of horrific sensorial stimuli: 
smelling the stench of burned and decomposing flesh; handling dismembered and 
mutilated bodies; hearing screams of pain, anguish and grief; witnessing ineradicable 
images of human remains. Disaster responders to mass casualty incidents have to deal 
with the bloodied, crushed, charred, bloated, disfigured remnants of people, as they 
reclaim the fragments of lifeless children and adults, youths and tots  
Moreover, in the performance of their duties, responders must often place their 
own physical safety at risk and their personal reactions on hold. On any given 
deployment, they may be called upon to work amid hazards of falling debris, aftershocks, 
exposure to blood and airborne pathogens, extreme weather conditions, unsanitary 
settings, smoke, toxic fumes, radiation hazards and inhalational particulate. The negative 
influence of such stressors can only be compounded by the physical discomfort, 
exhaustion, disrupted sleep, and emotions of fear, anxiety, and grief the responder must 
withstand. Elementally, disaster workers experience their own feelings about the 
traumatic event(s) that activated their deployment. However, responders often delay their 
reactions for extended periods of time in order to maintain focus upon safety and the 
mission at hand.46  
Deploying to traumatic events, suppressing their own negative reactions, 
experiencing anxiety for personal safety, and bearing the intense stress evoked by their 
responsibilities can be deleteriously taxing to the responder’s psyche.47 In point of fact, 
                                                 
46 Katherine Harmon, “The Changing Mental Health Aftermath of 9/11—Psychological ‘First Aid’ 
Gains Favor over Debriefings: Scientific American,” Scientific American, September 10, 2011, 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=the-changing-mental-
health&WT.mc_id=SA_emailfriend. 
47 Larry E. Beutler et al., “The Need for Proficient Mental Health Professionals in the Study of 
Terrorism.” In Psychology of Terrorism, ed. Bruce Bongar et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
32; Paton and Violani, “Terrorism Risk Assessment and Management,” 233–234; “Traumatic Incident 
Stress,” last modified December 30, 2013, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Education 
and Information Division, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/traumaticincident/. 
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first responders and disaster workers are “at special risk for Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder and other negative emotional consequences of disaster.”48 Such negative 
emotional consequences can manifest in many ways, including: depression, anxiety, 
nightmares, disinterest in food, isolation, and substance abuse.49 Herein, these negative 
emotional consequences are collectively referred to as “critical stress.”50  
Members of our armed forces comprise another population of public servants, 
whose duties place them in personal danger, expose them to atrocities, the necessity of 
suppressing visceral reactions, and the harmful influences of persistent intense stress. 
And like disaster responders, our service personnel exhibit signs of critical stress, 
including acute stress and diagnosable post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 
Accordingly, despite the palpable dissimilarities between civilian emergency responses 
and military deployments, there are many overlaps in analyses of critical stress amongst 
disaster responders and deployed military personnel. To date, much of the material 
exploring individual resilience to critical stress is the work of, and focused upon, the 
military community.  
B. PROVIDING CRITICAL STRESS INTERVENTIONS: ARTICULATED 
PRINCIPLES AND AMBIGUOUS POLICY 
1. Principles: Doing What Is Right 
Acknowledging the risks posed to their members by critical stress, emergency 
response organizations and the military are implementing forms of critical stress 
                                                 
48 Gibbs and Montagnino, Disasters: A Psychological Perspective, 10. 
49 “Emergency Preparedness and Response, Safety and Health Guides—Critical Incident Stress 
Guide,” Occupational Safety and Health Administration, accessed March 17, 2014, https://www.osha.gov/
SLTC/emergencypreparedness/guides/critical.html 
50 For purposes of this paper, the term “critical stress,” comprehends stress responses that manifest by 
the subject experiencing negative physical and/or psychopathological symptomology. For example, the 
appellation “critical stress,” as used herein, encompasses Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), or any 
one the criteria that comprise a PTSD diagnosis, such as: “ . . . re-experiencing the traumatic event, usually 
in flashbacks or nightmares; . . . avoidance of situations and stimuli that could reawaken the trauma, for 
example, numbing one’s feelings or withdrawing from others; and . . . increased level of arousal, for 
instance, sleep difficulties, irritability, and concentration problems.” See also footnote 3. Margaret Gibbs, 
and Kim Montagnino, “Disasters, A Psychological Perspective,” accessed November 24, 2012, 
http://www.training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/docs/EMT/GibbsPsychology.doc, 8.  
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management, and utilizing various critical stress interventions.51 Organizationally 
provided psychosocial resources, most readily available at a local level, include: critical 
incident stress management, critical incident stress debriefings, employee wellness 
programs, employee assistance programs, access to local Department of Mental Health 
providers, workers’ compensation, chaplains, psychological first aid, and trained peer-to-
peer support.  
The provision of such psychosocial resources for disaster responders coincides 
with the principles articulated in numerous government emergency management related 
publications. The Emergency Responder Health Monitoring and Surveillance (ERHMS) 
system was promulgated in 2012 by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) working collectively with the U.S. National Response Team (NRT), and 
a number of federal agencies, state health departments, labor unions, and volunteer 
emergency responder groups. The ERHMS is comprised of two documents, the NRT 
Technical Assistance Document and A Guide for Key Decision Makers.52 A summary of 
the ERHMS describes the program as providing “guidelines for the protection of 
emergency responders over a full range of emergency types and settings.”53  
The NRT Technical Assistance Document states: “The exposures addressed in this 
document include chemical and physical hazards, as well as ‘psychological toxins’ 
[emphasis added]. These include encountering extremely stressful situations, such as 
witnessing loss of life, injuries, separated families, and destruction.”54 The document 
goes on to make the assertion,  
Monitoring for potential mental health needs is important [emphasis 
added]. Response-related challenges include uncertainty about the impact 
                                                 
51 Jackson et al., Protecting Emergency Responders. 
52 “Emergency Responder Health Monitoring and Surveillance (ERHMS),” Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention, accessed July 17, 2013, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/erhms/. 
53 Ibid. 
54 U.S. National Response Team, Emergency Responder Health Monitoring and Surveillance, 
Technical Assistance Document, v. 
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of the disaster, threats to livelihood and diminished quality of life, fatigue, 
family and dependent care issues, and other stressors.55  
The purported intent of ERHMS is: 
to identify exposures and/or signs and symptoms early in the course of an 
emergency response in order to prevent or mitigate adverse physical 
and psychological outcomes and ensure workers maintain their ability to 
respond effectively and are not harmed in the course of this response work 
[emphasis added].  
Unfortunately, while the ERHMS Responder Training Documentation Form 
includes a “Self Care/Buddy Care: Physical, Emotional, Medical Work Schedule,” the 
ERHMS never spells out to whom the responsibility for addressing responder 
psychosocial care belongs. The ERHMS’s sparse comments regarding responder 
“emotional health status,” while alluding to the issue of psychological well-being, lack 
pragmatic substance.  
Emergency management’s obligation to safeguard the mental as well as the 
physical well-being of responders also appears throughout the 2005 NOISH/RAND 
collaboration, Protecting Emergency Responders , Volume 3, Safety Management in 
Disaster and Terrorism Response. Several portions of that paper examine the issue of 
critical incident stress as an element of the overall hazard environment faced by re-
sponders to major disasters. In summation, the NOISH/RAND analysis propounds 
Recommendation 6.7: “Protect the Mental Health of the Response Workforce by 
Managing Critical Incident Stress.”56  
The recommendation to protect the mental health of the response workforce by 
managing critical incident stress (6.7) was founded upon the study’s findings that: 
 Traumatic nature of disasters can have significant effects on individual 
responders and response organizations as a whole. 
 There has been a cultural change in the responder community that has 
resulted in responder organizations implementing some form of critical 
stress management. 
                                                 
55 Ibid., 30. 
56 Jackson et al., Protecting Emergency Responders. 
 26
 There is controversy over methods of critical stress interventions. 
 Without examining particular methods, the study addressed critical stress 
management, “as an element of the overall hazard environment faced by 
responders to major disasters with respect to preparedness and response 
planning.” 
 It is important to consider critical incident stress in response planning. 
 Beyond emergency responders, such as police and firefighters, planning 
should address the needs of non-traditional disaster workers as well. 
 Importance of support to families of emergency responders 
 As an element of preparedness, communities need to develop local 
resources for handling critical incident stress or have a plan to access other 
resources. 
 While preventative measures have been garnering support in the responder 
community, little research existed on “stress inoculation” (a military 
concept) and “pre-briefings.”57 
The recommendation concludes that the controversy over the efficacy of various 
methods of critical stress interventions: 
… indicates a need for further examination of this issue and further 
development of strategies to address the effects of traumatic incidents on 
individuals. In light of the potential long-term effects on individuals and 
response organizations, responders indicated that it was important to 
monitor workers during an incident for signs of excessive stress and 
follow up afterwards to ensure that individuals in need of treatment get 
it.58  
The recommendation is to “take action,” without specifying what action(s) to 
take. 
Tips for critical incident stress management are also recounted by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services in A Guide to Managing Stress in Crisis 
Response Professions, and on the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s web page, 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, “Workplace Safety Health Topics, 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 62–64.  
58 Ibid., 64. 
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Traumatic Incident Stress.”59 These publications are excellent for raising awareness 
about critical incident stress. Moreover, they provide emergency managers with some 
practical advice about managing stress before, during and after an event.60 However, 
while these guides are replete with helpful suggestions, they fall short of establishing 
standards for emergency management.61 The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) Critical Incident Stress Guide resoundingly states, “OSHA has 
no standards that apply to the hazards associated with critical incident stress.”62 For 
policy, (whereby principles become implemented), we must look to the National Incident 
Management System.63 
2. Policies: Doing What Is Written 
The National Incident Management System (NIMS), utilized in the United States, 
provides a uniform emergency management structure, which places all coordination 
under incident command with delegation to command staff and the four branches 
(planning, operations, logistics, fiscal/admin) depending upon the scale of the event.  
Unfortunately, the current NIMS structure does not directly address the responder 
mental/emotional well-being. NIMS places responsibility for responder safety with the 
incident commander initially. As the size and dimensions of an emergency event warrant 
                                                 
59 “Traumatic Incident Stress,” last modified December 30, 2013, National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health Education and Information Division, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/
traumaticincident/. 
60 Practical suggestions include being familiar with NIMS ICS, encouraging breaks, providing non-
caffeine fluids, mitigating effects of extreme temperatures and reducing noise. The post event “action 
steps” include “Developing protocols to provide workers with stigma-free counseling so that workers can 
address the emotional aspects of their experience.” USDHHS, A Guide to Managing Stress; “Traumatic 
Incident Stress,” last modified December 30, 2013, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
Education and Information Division, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/traumaticincident/ 
61 “Emergency Preparedness and Response, Safety and Health Guides—Critical Incident Stress 
Guide,” Occupational Safety and Health Administration, accessed March 17, 2014, https://www.osha.gov/
SLTC/emergencypreparedness/guides/critical.html. 
62 According to OSHA, “OSHA has no standards that apply to the hazards associated with critical 
incident stress. However, in the interest of the health and safety of the emergency responders and workers, 
the agency recommends that the following information be shared to help reduce the risks associated with 
critical incident stress.” “Emergency Preparedness and Response, Safety and Health Guides—Critical 
Incident Stress Guide,” Occupational Safety and Health Administration, accessed March 17, 2014, 
https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/emergencypreparedness/guides/critical.html.  
63 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Appendix B.” 
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expansion of the command structure, the responsibility for responder safety may be 
delegated to a safety officer. Pursuant to Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) Incident Command System (ICS) glossary, the safety officer is: “A member of 
the Command staff responsible for monitoring and assessing safety hazards or unsafe 
situations, and for developing measures for ensuring personnel safety.”64 
FEMA’s Safety Officer Checklist, distributed by the Emergency Management 
Institute, describes tasks that should be considered as minimum requirements for the 
position. For example, a safety officer is to identify hazardous situations and ensure 
adequate levels of protective equipment are available and being used. Significantly, the 
only reference to responder mental/emotional well-being is relegated to item number 13, 
“Coordinate critical incident stress, hazardous materials, and other debriefings, as 
necessary.”65  
Within FEMA’s 2008 publication describing the National Incident Management 
System, Appendix B contains this definition of the safety officer:  
b. Safety Officer: 
The Safety Officer monitors incident operations and advises Incident 
Command on all matters relating to operational safety, including the 
health and safety of emergency responder personnel. The ultimate 
responsibility for the safe conduct of incident management operations 
rests with the IC or Unified Command (UC) and supervisors at all levels 
of incident management. In turn, the Safety Officer is responsible for 
developing the Incident Safety Plan—the set of systems and procedures 
necessary to ensure ongoing assessment of hazardous environments, 
coordination of multi-agency safety efforts, and implementation of 
measures to promote emergency management/incident personnel safety, as 
well as the general safety of incident operations. The Safety Officer has 
emergency authority to stop and/or prevent unsafe acts during incident 
operations. . . .66 
                                                 
64 Glossary and Related Terms, s.v., “Safety Officer,” FEMA Incident Command System Resource 
Center, February 2012, http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/is/ICSResource/Glossary.htm#S. 
65 Glossary and Related Terms, s.v., “Checklist, Safety Officer Position Checklist,” FEMA Incident 
Command System Resource Center, February 2012, http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/is/ICSResource/
Glossary.htm#C.  
66 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Appendix B,” 93. 
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Following this definition, FEMA provides an illustration of the Incident 
Command System (ICS), with examples of assistant safety officers assigned to 
operational branches (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1.  Example of the role of safety officer and assistant safety officer in ICS in a 
multi-branch incident.67  
                                                 
67 Ibid., 94. 
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Noteworthy, is that FEMA’s definition of safety officer is silent as to responder 
emotional health as is the description of the NIMS core curriculum for safety officer.68 
Historically, FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute provided a 50-minute session on 
critical incident stress management as part of the Disaster Response Operations and 
Management curriculum of the Upper Division College Course (session 23). However, 
the current (2014) curriculum does not offer such a course for emergency managers.69 
Unless and until the framework of NIMS is interpreted as requiring the incident 
commander/safety officer be accountable for the mental well-being of disaster 
responders, emergency managers’ education about interventions and resources to address 
responder critical incident stress will remain elective. 
In the context of overall disaster response, emergency workers are only 
tangentially considered in the U.S. guidance on provision of humanitarian assistance. 
When our central government engages during very large catastrophic events, the 
emphasis for humanitarian assistance during a disaster is focused upon the civilian 
populace.  
Within the Emergency Support Function #8 “Public Health and Medical Services 
Annex,” the only mention of disaster workers is buried in a paragraph entitled “Health 
Surveillance” (under Public Health and Medical Services Core Capabilities) which states, 
“Uses existing all-hazards surveillance systems to monitor the health of the general and 
medical needs population, as well as that of the response workers, and identify emerging 
trends related to the disaster.”70  
The ambiguity in our policy with respect to psychosocial resources is hazardous. 
FEMA has made critical stress management courses available through the Emergency 
                                                 
68 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System Training 
Program, 2011, http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/ICSResource/assets/nims_training_program.pdf; 
Emergency Management Institute, EMI Fiscal Year 2014 Training Catalog FY14 Catalog, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2014, http://training.fema.gov/EMICourses/docs/FY14%20Catalog.pdf. 
69 The Emergency Management Institute currently offers, E0352, “Crisis Counseling Assistance and 
Training Program” as part of the Training State Trainers curriculum. Emergency Management Institute, 
“EMI Fiscal Year 2014 Training Catalog FY14 Catalog.” 
70 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Support Function #8: Public Health and 
Medical Services Annex, 2013, http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/32198, ESF 8–5. 
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Management Institute and has shaped a disaster management structure responsive to the 
public’s mental health needs during a catastrophic event. However, the framework of 
NIMS neither encourages pursuit of the mental health protecting principals articulated by 
ERHMS, nor ensures implementation of the NIOSH/RAND recommendation “6.7 – 
Protect the Mental Health of the Response Workforce by Managing Critical Incident 
Stress.”71  
Because social support and conventional interventions, to the extent they are 
provided, are most readily available at the local level, the policy’s ambiguity is especially 
perilous for individuals responding to disasters outside their home jurisdiction. For the 
U.S. emergency management system to adequately address the mental/emotional health 
of multi-jurisdictional disaster responders, NIMS must be understood as requiring the 
incident commander/safety officer be responsible for both the physical and emotional 
health of the responders.72  
Implicitly carried with this interpretation would be the proliferation of training 
modules to support it, including more widely disseminated components addressing 
disaster responder stress. Through core NIMS training, emergency managers, and 
perhaps other leaders in the homeland security enterprise would become cognizant of 
their responsibility for the mental well-being of disaster responders. It would become the 
duty of the incident commander, and in larger events the safety officer, to ensure 
provision of humanitarian assistance to the members of all the operational teams. In this 
way, the emotional health of emergency workers who are responding outside of their own 
local jurisdictions would be addressed. As it stands, multi-jurisdictional responders can 
be left standing on their own.  
 
                                                 
71 Jackson et al., Protecting Emergency Responders, 62. 
72 Referring back to Figure 1, if the safety officer is recognized as responsible for the emotional health 
of responders, one could envision the safety officer, where appropriate, assigning assistant safety officer(s) 
to the oversee the provision of humanitarian assistance to the responders comprising the operations branch. 
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C. THE PRACTICAL GAP 
There is a confluence of circumstances, whereby the psychosocial needs of 
disaster responders may go unmet.  
1. Neither NIMS Nor Its Guidelines Specifically Make Responder 
Mental/Emotional Health a Responsibility of Incident Command  
The ambiguity of NIMS and its guidelines leaves open to interpretation whether 
or not incident command’s responsibility for responder health and safety encompasses 
mental/emotional well-being. Therefore, ensuring disaster responder access to 
psychosocial resources may or may not be within an entity’s emergency plan. Emergency 
managers are not required, nor necessarily trained, to recognize the critical incident stress 
risks faced by disaster responders. Nor must they be knowledgeable about what 
psychosocial resources are available to assist responders in the event such are needed.  
Moreover, because critical stress management is not part of the NIMS core 
curriculum for emergency managers, what training can be obtained is not uniform. 
Therefore, the manner of psychosocial resources accessible to responders at any given 
incident will vary with the disposition, knowledge and/or biases of incident command. 
There is no clear responsibility for emergency managers to investigate and ascertain what 
the best practices for critical incident stress intervention are, nor for incident command to 
be apprised of the psychosocial resources within reach.  
2. Debate over Best Practices Can End with None  
The controversy over best practices in critical incident stress intervention leaves 
the field open to the deprecation of cynics.73 Emergency managers who are reluctant to 
undertake responsibility to provide responders with access to psychosocial resources, 
may argue that the ongoing debate justifies their inertia. Without industry-accepted 
standards, how are they to proceed? Is it not better to provide no resources, than 
introduce a harmful influence? Unfortunately, the current controversy may also be 
fueling the existent cultural stigma against responders seeking “mental health” resources. 
                                                 
73 Jackson et al., Protecting Emergency Responders, 62–65. 
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3. Cultural Stigma  
Regrettably, when critical stress interventions are made accessible, some disaster 
workers will hesitate to avail themselves of the assistance. They may be hindered by a 
cultural stigma surrounding “mental health.” The basis for their reluctance may be 
grounded upon feared career repercussions. They may be uncertain whether or not their 
security clearance may be jeopardized if they seek psychological assistance or fear the 
possibility that a provider will find them “not fit for duty.” They may also fear of 
appearing to colleagues as “weak” or “unsafe.” In addition, real or imagined concerns 
about prejudice, reputation and advancement may all combine to prevent responders from 
accepting offered help.74  
4. Logistics (Impracticality) 
Mutual aid is a cornerstone of emergency management. Response to a 
catastrophic event necessarily requires resources beyond those of the locality struck by 
disaster. Disaster workers from multiple jurisdictions are deployed across state lines and 
internationally to render aid. As a consequence, at the same time that they are facing 
exposure to extreme stressors, responders may be physically out of reach of employer-
provided critical stress interventions. Away from their local jurisdictions, these mutual 
aid responders may not have access to employee assistance, critical incident stress 
management protocols, workers’ compensation, or department of mental health 
providers. To compound their predicament, individual responders are distanced from 
their home and may also be separated from traditional sources of psychosocial support: 
colleagues, family, friends and pastoral care.  
 
 
                                                 
74 Institute of Medicine, Building a Resilient Workforce, 26–34; Joseph I. Ruzek, Shira Maguen, and 
Brett T. Litz, “Evidence-Based Interventions for Survivors of Terrorism,” in Psychology of Terrorism, ed. 
Bruce Bongar et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 264–265. 
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III. SPANNING THE GAP: LINKING SOCIAL SUPPORT AND 
RESILIENCY—INTRODUCING PRECEPTS OF SOCIAL 
IDENTITY THEORY AND SWIFT TRUST  
Literature addressing responder, military, and civilian exposure to critical stress 
universally catalogues the availability of positive social support for facilitating recovery 
from trauma.75 Social connectedness is an essential factor among the models for early 
critical stress intervention, such as psychological first aid and peer-support, after a 
disaster.76 Studies of critical incident stress also link social support with resilience.77 The 
enhancement of social support is recognized as a primary factor to promoting resiliency 
that may serve to protect against or assist the recovery from traumatic events.78  
By investigating nuances of social connectedness, can we tap into sources for 
resilience-fostering social support? The studies of social identity theory and swift trust 
examine the influences of social support upon group members’ motivational behavior, 
and operational performance, respectively.79 Social identity theory elucidates individuals’ 
inherent need to “belong,” and the psychological remunerations actuating one to conform 
to group mores. The social support that is elemental among “home” emergency response 
teams can be viewed and explained in terms of social identity theory.80 Swift trust 
                                                 
75 Brett Litz and Matt Gray, Richard Bryant, and Amy Adler, “Early Intervention for Trauma: Current 
Status and Future Directions,” United States Department of Veterans Affairs, National Center for PTSD, 
accessed September 10, 2012, http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/pages/early-intervention-for-
trauma.asp; “Traumatic Incident Stress,” last modified December 30, 2013, National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health Education and Information Division, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/
traumaticincident/; World Health Organization, Psychological First Aid: Guide for Field Workers, 2011, 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789241548205_eng.pdf; USDHHS, A Guide to Managing 
Stress. 
76 David M. Benedek, Carol Fullerton, and Robert J. Ursano, “First Responders: Mental Health 
Consequences of Natural and Human-Made Disasters for Public Health and Public Safety Workers,” 
Annual Review of Public Health 28 (2007): 62; Money et al., Best Practices Identified for Peer Support 
Programs. 
77 Paton and Violani, “Terrorism Risk Assessment and Management,” 227. 
78 California National Guard, California Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Resilience Trainer Assistant 
Course (Sacramento, CA: California National Guard, 2012); Money et al., Best Practices Identified for 
Peer Support Programs. 
79 Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations; Hyllengren et al., “Swift Trust in Leaders in 
Temporary Military Groups.” 
80 Haslam et al., “Taking the Strain.” 
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explores intra-group dynamics that contribute towards maximizing performance from 
temporary teams. Among the “temporary work groups” that have been examined through 
the lens of swift trust are teams comprised of responders from diverse agencies, 
temporary military groups, and remote information technology project teams. 
A. VALUE OF SOCIAL SUPPORT—RAISING RESILIENCE  
“The basic notion of resilience is the capacity to bounce back from 
stress, pressure, or disturbance [emphasis added].”81 
A leading trend for addressing responder and service personnel exposure to 
critical stress is the movement towards building resilience.82 As defined in the Institute of 
Medicine’s Building a Resilient Workforce: Opportunities for the Department of 
Homeland Security: Workshop Summary, “The basic notion of resilience is the capacity 
to bounce back from stress, pressure, or disturbance.”83 Without abandoning traditional 
interventions, such as counseling, chaplaincy and formal peer-to-peer support, current 
training practices in the field of critical stress are geared towards prevention and 
mitigation. A key component of resilience is social support, which can be derived from a 
variety of sources, including family, friends, colleagues and community.84  
During day-to-day operations, responder work/rest routines are conducive to an 
atmosphere infused by peer social support. Engaged in a calling where job shifts can 
exceed 12 hours, co-workers eat together and sleep under the same roof. The strong 
bonds that develop between emergency responder teammates, such as law enforcement 
partners, fire engine crews, paramedic units, are founded upon mutual experiences, 
mundane and extraordinary. Jointly dedicated to missions serving the public, these men 
and women risk their lives side by side, entrusting each other with their safety and 
                                                 
81 Institute of Medicine, Building a Resilient Workforce, 44. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Lucia Pietrantoni and Gabriele Prati, “Resilience Among First Responders,” special issue, African 
Health Sciences 8 (December 2008): 18; Philip T. McCabe, “First Responders: Self Care, Wellness, Health, 
Resilience & Recovery—Dealing with Stress: Personal, Departmental/Job, Home & Family in the 
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survival. Sharing both the triumphs and the tragedies of rescue work, they are too often 
participants at scenes so horrific that no one outside their community could truly 
comprehend. So they talk with one another. At the station, over a meal, taking a break, 
they talk with one another. For each other, they are a source of social support. And after 
shift, on routine days, these responders return to the social support of their families, 
friends and community involvement.  
In their study, Resilience among First Responders, Lucia Pietrantoni and Gabriele 
Prati opine that first responders’ reliance upon personal and social resources could aid 
their coping with critical incident stress.85 Inopportunely, the quintessential multi-
jurisdictional response can diminish or impede disaster workers’ access to many or all of 
their established social support systems. Deployments of certain specialty rescue “teams,” 
such as National Urban Search and Rescue (USAR), are comprised assembling cracker-
jack specialists from numerous jurisdictions. While these specialists are intermittently 
brought together for training, they are not “colleagues” in that they do not regularly work 
together, side by side, on a year-round basis. Collectively, they are trained to operate as a 
team, but they do not share a history of working together day-to-day and socially 
interacting as “teammates.”86  
Although the individual responders likely gain self-esteem from being a part of 
the National USAR, they may not necessarily socially identify with temporary work 
                                                 
85 Lucia Pietrantoni and Gabriele Prati, “Resilience Among First Responders,”518.  
86 “In the wake of the devastating mudslide that struck northwest Washington on Saturday [3-22-14] 
Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. today [3-24-14] directed the California Governor’s Office of Emergency 
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Sends 18 Urban Search and Rescue Personnel to Assist with Deadly Washington Mudslide” press release, 
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groups. To the extent “swift trust”87 is developed between the members it is task driven, 
based upon organizational rather than interpersonal characteristics.88 The work of Haslam 
and his co-authors supports the proposition that in order to benefit from a group’s social 
support, it is important that one identifies with the group.89 This defining one’s self 
through group affiliations is the core of social identity theory.  
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF FEELING ONESELF A MEMBER OF A 
GROUP—SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION ENABLES SOCIAL SUPPORT 
“[A] sense of shared identity is argued to be a basis for both giving 
and receiving social support [emphasis added].”90 
John Turner suggests that social identification can refer to “any social 
categorization used by a person to define him—or herself and others.”91 Henri Tajfel 
defined social identity as “[t]he individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social 
groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of the group 
membership.”92 A group is “any given body of people who consider themselves so.”93 In 
its simplest terms, social identity encompasses viewing oneself as part of a group, and 
feeling good about oneself, and the group, because of it.  
Brannan, Darken and Strindberg apply social identity theory to the study of 
terrorism as “a model for understanding how the relationship between the individual 
member and the group affects group behavior, and a model for understanding intergroup 
relations and conflict.”94 Through social identity theory, they explain how the “group is a 
source of social identity,” and “this identity hinges on the positive value and positive 
                                                 
87 Fayh defines swift trust as “a trust that forms between individuals or groups without a prior 
relationship.” The concept of swift trust will be explored in the next section. Fahy, “Understanding Swift 
Trust,” 2. 
88 Ibid., 19. 
89 Haslam et al., “Taking the Strain,” 367. 
90 Ibid., 357. 
91 John C. Turner, “Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group,” 17–18. 
92 Ibid., 18. 
93 Andres Strindberg and David Brannan, “Social Identity Theory, Module II” (internal document, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2013).  
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emotional attachment of group membership.” They suggest that in order to perpetuate 
their existence, groups must provide their members with a positive social identity.95  
One means for a group’s elite to improve the positive value and emotions 
associated with the in-group, in relation to a dominant out-group, is “social creativity.”96 
Brannan, Darken and Strindberg describe social creativity as “largely a matter of 
inculcating/indoctrinating group members with a new sense of themselves and of their 
group’s purpose.”97 They discourse on the effectiveness of social creativity as a tool for 
group leadership to enhance members’ social identity and “thus protect group cohesion.” 
Might emergency team leaders utilize this powerful tactic to enhance disaster responders’ 
social identity with their temporary work groups to foster social support?  
In the milieu of stress resilience and recovery, social identity has been assessed as 
contributing to the efficacy of social support. As stated by Haslam et al., “[A] sense of 
shared identity is argued to be a basis for both giving and receiving social support.”98 
Why is this? S. Alexander Haslam has conducted studies and authored a body of work 
that explores the role social identity theory and self-categorization play in structuring 
people’s experience of stress and hence their stress outcomes. In “Taking the Strain: 
Social Identity, Social Support, and the Experience of Stress,” Haslam and his co-authors 
guide us through research analyzing the psychological processes of experiencing stress.  
A foundational premise of this work is that “the impact of any given stressor 
depends on the way that it is construed by the person who is exposed to it.”99 Initially, 
stress was conceptualized as the outcome of a two-phase process of appraisal: primary 
appraisal—the perceiver’s assessment of the degree of threat posed by a stressor; and 
secondary appraisal—involving the perceiver’s assessment of their own ability to cope 
with that threat.100 With focus upon the mechanisms through which social support 
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reduces stress, four functionalities were identified, each form of input contributing to a 
positive secondary appraisal (the perceiver’s assessment of their ability to cope the 
threat). According to Haslam et al.: 
Specifically, [social support] can provide an individual with (a) a sense of 
acceptance and self-worth (emotional support), (b) affiliation and contact 
with others (social companionship), (c) concrete aid, material resources, 
and financial assistance (instrumental support), or (d) information useful 
in understanding and coping with potentially stressful events 
(informational support).101 
Haslam and his co-authors observe that when viewed through the lens of social 
identity and self-categorization, a more complex model of stress is suggested, one “in 
which appraisal processes and stress outcomes are structured by group memberships that 
are internalized by individuals to a greater or lesser extent.”102 The findings of Haslam et 
al. were that “(a) the nature and strength of a person’s group identification and (b) the 
meaning of a specific stressor in relation to that identity are both very important 
predictors of any given stressor’s impact.”103 Haslam et al. also propose that social 
support is not a “free-floating variable” that people tap into. Rather, Haslam and his co-
authors suggest, “People only perceive and only receive social support when they sense 
that they share self-defining group membership with those in a position to provide it.”104 
How does this pertain to disaster responders? Within their home jurisdictions, 
emergency workers daily interact, identify and self-categorize with their colleagues. They 
belong to the same agency. They share both mundane and intense experiences. They 
define for each other the normalcy of their reactions to critical stress incidents. They are 
positioned to give and receive social support amongst their in-group. But as discussed in 
previous sections, the disaster responder who is part of a large deployment may be 
distanced from the local in-groups with whom he/she identifies.  
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During an emergency, responders arrive on scene perceiving themselves as 
belonging to certain social groups, including their respective deploying agency (such as 
Sacramento Metropolitan Fire, Los Angeles Fire Department, etc.). In Multiculturalism 
and Intergroup Relations, Fathali M. Moghaddam expands upon the work of Tajfel and 
psychologist Muzafer Sherif, as he explores the idea of superordinate goals. The concept 
of superordinate groups proposes “under certain conditions group members come to 
perceive themselves as belonging to subgroups encompassed by a superordinate group 
identity.”105 Theoretically, it follows that when assembled to form temporary work 
teams, multi-jurisdictional disaster responders, who each socially identifying with their 
home agency (subgroup), might be brought to perceive themselves as also belonging to a 
superordinate group (the disaster response team). 
Fahy’s work expounded upon hurdles preventing multiple agencies, specifically 
the NYPD and FDNY, from successfully collaborating when responding to the same 
incident. The obstacles Fahy identified, organizational and cultural barriers, were chiefly 
group characteristics. In addition, Fahy points to differing procedures and 
communications protocols as impediments coordinated operational efficiency. These 
hindrances were apparent at responses where the two groups, each maintaining their own 
group identity, tried to synchronize their efforts. However, in his examination of New 
York City’s Urban Search and Rescue Team (NY-TF1), a combined temporary team 
comprised of both NYPD and FDNY together, Fahy highlights factors that contribute to 
the development of swift trust.106  
Fahy describes “swift trust” as “a trust that forms between individuals or groups 
without a prior relationship”107 “...a unique form of trust that occurs between groups or 
individuals brought together in temporary teams to accomplish specific tasks, often under 
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time constraints.”108 His research examines the behaviors displayed by temporary groups 
“that presupposes trust without any history of trust development among the group.”109  
A recurrent academic definition of “swift trust” is the “unique form of collective 
perception and relating that is capable of managing issues of vulnerability, uncertainty, 
risk and expectations.”110 Assessed in the context of team performance, the study of swift 
trust is founded upon the premise that trust is needed for “cooperation and the 
information sharing needed to achieve collaborative problem solving.”111 Swift trust is 
proposed to operate in temporary teams, particularly when there is pressure.112  
Fahy identified dynamics facilitating swift trust, including quality initial 
interactions and formulation of a team identity.113 Dr. Roxanne Zolin has observed, “The 
initial condition for swift trust is that participants perceive that they belong to the 
temporary team.”114 Other factors that can contribute to accelerating trust amid 
temporary teams include: a leader’s positivity, the tenor of the first meeting, 
communication/social skills, and the frequency with which the group meets.115  
Yet to be explored is the fostering of team identity amongst temporary disaster 
work groups and whether, like swift trust, that process can be “accelerated.” The 
development of stratagems for cultivating superordinate groups amongst responders may 
find root in Tajfel’s minimal group paradigm.  
Moghaddam’s analysis illuminates Tajfel’s minimal group paradigm. Pursuant to 
this scheme, Moghaddam advances that “just about any criterion for social categorization 
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can be used by group members to construct a positive and distinct identity for 
themselves.”116 The intrinsic value (or triviality) of the criterion is not crucial to its 
influence on the intergroup. In the minimal group paradigm experiments, subjects 
exhibited group bias based upon social categorization that had been wrought upon a 
minimal criterion (e.g., how one sees ambiguous colors on slides). The studies’ 
participants were not known to each other, and they did not have or expect to have 
contact with the members of the “group.” In these characteristics, the experiment subjects 
can be likened to members of temporary work groups, such as multi-jurisdictional 
disaster response teams.  
By extrapolating from these concepts of social identity theory and swift trust, one 
may posit if they are encouraged to perceive themselves as “belonging” to a 
superordinate group whether disaster responders deployed from diverse jurisdictions may 
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IV. BUILDING TEAM BELAY: “ACCELERATING” GROUP 
SOCIAL IDENTITY WITHIN TEMPORARY TEAMS TO 
PROPAGATE SOCIAL SUPPORT 
The most promising strategy for primary prevention of problems related to 
occupational stress interventions in these professions must deal with 
enhancing those features of organizational performance, . . .  and social 
support that provide effective response and promote personal and 
organizational resilience.117  
Building team belay, contemplates a strategy for bolstering resilience to critical 
stress, by devising and employing criteria calculated to prompt group identification amid 
temporary disaster response teams.118 
A. RIGGING SUPERORDINATED IN-GROUPS AMONG TEMPORARY 
TEAMS—THE HYPOTHESIS  
In a catastrophic event, responders will be deployed from diverse jurisdictions to 
assist with response and recovery. This multi-jurisdictional/mutual aid response will 
require individual team members to leave their local jurisdictions, and local operational 
teams, in order to perform disaster work in another city, state, or country. Under such 
circumstances, home-agency group identification may not be available to the responder 
as a source of social support and resilience. Is there a way to bring the station house 
“kitchen table” into the disaster responders’ canteen?  
The research suggests that temporary multi-jurisdictional teams can be united, if 
the individuals comprising them can view themselves as part of a larger group, a 
superordinate in-group. Drawing upon exemplars of the minimal group paradigm, it 
should be possible to fabricate social categorization upon even an insubstantial criterion.  
                                                 
117 Richard Gist, “Promoting Resilience and Recovery in First Responders,” In Psychology of 
Terrorism, edited by Bruce Bongar et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 426. 
118 Col. Paul Bliese, an organizational psychologist from the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research 
(WRAIR) in Washington, DC and the WRIAR’s overseas lab, the U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-
Europe in Germany, remarked, “[t]he literature suggests that group cohesion supports resilience,” Institute 
of Medicine, Building a Resilient Workforce. 
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When bringing together temporary multi-jurisdictional disaster response teams, 
some emergency management team leaders intuitively attempt to propagate familiarity. 
The means that have been employed are varied. In one instance, a National USAR team 
leader had the bus take the “scenic route,” the long way round, when transporting newly 
arrived responders to the disaster site. His object was to give the temporary teams 
members an opportunity to develop name/face recognition.119 In another instance, an 
international urban search and rescue team leader issued distinctive t-shirts to all those 
who deployed from his country, identifying the rescuers from Sweden as a superordinate 
group. Although the responders had deployed from different agencies and locals, the t-
shirts, which became a symbol of that rescue effort, served as one criterion for social 
categorization amongst all the Swedish responders.120  
Multi-jurisdictional disaster responders should not have to rely upon the innate 
acumen of their team leaders to propagate group social identification amongst temporary 
team members. This study supports dedicating resources to the development of devices 
for “accelerated” group identification. In the absence of social identification, social 
support, an element essential to resilience, will not be fostered.121  
B. FURTHER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT—DEVISING TOOLS 
FOR TRAVERSING FROM GROUP IDENTIFICATION TO SOCIAL 
SUPPORT TO RESILIENCE  
Still to be investigated is whether techniques can be contrived for emergency team 
leaders to introduce to their temporary teams criteria that will prime group identification. 
Those credentialed in education, training and exercises should be tasked with contriving 
simple devices for cultivating superordinate groups; devices that can be incorporated into 
the NIMS core courses for emergency team leaders; devices that can easily be employed 
                                                 
119 Lorenzo Gigliotti (Deputy Chief Special Operations, California Governor’s Office of Emergency 
Services), personal communication July 2913. Discussion related to circumstances of a National USAR 
deployment to aid tornado victims. 
120 Lars Hedstrom (Executive Director, Institute for National Defense and Security Policy Studies, 
Swedish National Defense College), personal communication, July 9, 2013. Discussion related to 
experience as head of Swedish Rescue and Support Team response to Thailand after the tsunami 
catastrophe. 
121 Haslam et al., “Taking the Strain.” 
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in the field. Every operational team leader of a temporary group should have means for 
instigating a shared perception of team membership within his or her “tool kit.”  
More research needs to be devoted to the development of such devices. The 
minimal group paradigm suggests one avenue of investigation explore whether same-
colored carabineers, water bottles, wristbands, or lanyards, or a team name, slogan, or 
moniker could serve as a criterion to initiate social characterization of a group. The 
studies into swift trust suggest that team leaders should be taught the importance of the 
initial meeting, exuding positivity, assigning tasks that bring the team together with 
frequency. As a mechanism for initiating contact, something as simple as asking a group 
of responders to perform equipment checks upon each other would provide a means for 
team members to connect. They would be given a minor task, which would entail making 
eye contact and possibly physical contact to check and adjust gear.122  
Given that social identification is essential to giving and receiving social support, 
it behooves the emergency management community to investigate how to foster 
temporary group members to construct a positive and distinct identity for themselves as a 
group. Worthy of further study is whether group identification would prime temporary 
group members to informal social exchange, such as increasing the likelihood of having 
coffee or meal together. If social identity can be “accelerated,” then temporary team 
members would be poised to provide and receive social support, an integral component to 
enhancing resilience.  
The impetus for such investigation would be supplied by FEMA interpreting the 
responsibilities of the incident command/safety officer and Essential Safety Function #8, 
to explicitly include meeting the needs of rescuers and response workers. To clarify that 
NIMS’ assignments encompass responsibility for the responder mental/emotional health, 
currently required NIMS core courses should be augmented to include management of 
psychosocial resources. Best practices must be discussed, and individual agencies must 
be prompted to ascertain and implement programs calculated to provide emergency 
responders access to critical stress interventions. NIMS core courses could be amended to 
                                                 
122 James Breckenridge (psychologist), personal communication, April 2013. 
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include teaching team leaders devices for cultivating superordinate group identity 
amongst multi-jurisdictional, mutual aid disaster responders. 
Refining the responsibilities of safety officer within NIMS will require a proposal 
to and collaboration with FEMA. The training requirements and modules for safety 
officer already exist, and they need only be expanded upon to embrace oversight of the 
psychosocial welfare of the disaster responders. The wheel need not be reinvented. The 
vehicle for delivering standardized training (and auditing compliance with educational 
requirements) has already been put into motion by FEMA. Implementation will merely 
require the augmentation of existing training modules. Best practices and available 
resources will then dictate how safety officers meet the psychosocial needs of disaster 
responders at any given event.  
As their responsibilities are explicated under NIMS, the safety officers will find 
they must become versed in the humanitarian assistance resources they can call upon and 
dispatch to support the responders during a large mutual aid event: local chaplaincies, 
accredited volunteer groups, the host jurisdictions’ mental health providers, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Red Cross. Many of these entities 
currently provide aid to civilian disaster survivors. Accordingly, the interpretation of ESF 
#8 to specifically address the psychosocial welfare of disaster responders could advance 
the expansion of the safety officers’ role under NIMS.  
One means of garnering support within the emergency management community 
would be through the launch of a successful pilot program. Given the recurrent multi-
jurisdictional dynamic of National Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) team deployments, 
the National USAR would provide an ideal testing ground for implementing such a pilot 
program.  
Training the emergency managers of the various agencies that comprise the 
National USAR teams, in tactics calculated to foster superordinate group identification, 
could enhance informal peer-to-peer social support amongst multi-jurisdictional response 
teams, building responder resilience to critical stress. Such a pilot would bring the 
psychosocial care of National USAR team responders within the NIMS framework. 
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While benefiting the team members, it will hopefully provide validation for acceptance of 
this proposal. If successful, it may lead to exploration of adaptation for a military 
application to enhance the social support available to demobilized service personnel.123  
Considering the significant National USAR team resources located in California, 
it would not be unreasonable to approach the California Governor’s Office of Emergency 
Services (Cal OES) with a proposal for developing such a pilot project. Cal OES’ 
California Specialized Training Institute has the subject matter expertise and resources to 
develop a curriculum for the National USAR team leaders, which would teach leveraging 




                                                 
123 The high suicide rate among National Guardsmen returning from deployment suggests that peer 
social support is critical for demobilized veterans. If the team unit identity can be perpetuated remotely, 
demobilized service personnel would have access to a source of social support. Different devices, such as 
providing secure web forums for continuing contact and requiring initial periodic contributions or check-ins 
should be explored. 
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It is incumbent upon emergency managers to be accountable for the psychosocial 
care of the disaster responders, just as it is their duty to ensure the physical safety of the 
responders under their command. However, our uniform organizational structure for 
disaster response, the National Incident Management System (NIMS), is ambiguous as to 
the mental/emotional well-being of disaster responders.  
One avenue for our emergency management system to address the psychosocial 
care of multi-jurisdictional disaster responders is an interpretation of NIMS that stipulates 
the incident commander/safety officer is responsible for both the physical and emotional 
health of the responders. Implicitly, carried with this interpretation would be the training 
modules to support it, including more widely disseminated components addressing 
disaster responder stress. Through core NIMS training, emergency managers and perhaps 
other leaders in the homeland security enterprise would become cognizant of their 
responsibility for the psychosocial well-being of disaster responders. It would be the clear 
duty of the incident commander, and in larger events the safety officer, to ensure 
provision of humanitarian assistance to the members of all the operational teams. In this 
way, the emotional health of emergency workers who are responding outside of their own 
local jurisdictions would be addressed.  
At first blush, interpreting NIMS and ESF #8 as addressing responder 
psychosocial needs could be presumed to increase the potential liability exposure of 
emergency management agencies and their leaders. In actuality, neither is assuming 
additional responsibility. Although not delineated in NIMS, the emergency response 
community is ultimately accountable for the total health and safety of the disaster 
responders. The cost of treatment and monetary compensation for injury to the mental/
emotional well-being of disaster responders is already embedded within their workers’ 
compensation premiums. What is to be hoped is that actual workers’ compensation 
claims will be reduced as informal peer social support is fostered and enhances resilience 
to critical stress. Greater resilience amongst the disaster workers is calculated to decrease 
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impact of critical stressors, which would result in fewer incidents of posttraumatic stress 
and other stress related injuries.  
Research supports the emergency management community dedicating resources 
to the development of “accelerated” group identity. Just as swift trust contributes to 
operational performance in temporary teams, “accelerated” group identity is calculated to 
augment social support amongst temporary team members. Multi-jurisdictional disaster 
responses can separate individuals from their home teams and from conventional critical 
stress interventions and traditional sources of social support. Social support is a vital 
component of individual resilience to critical stressors. But social support is not a “free 
flowing” resource. Social identification is a pre-requisite to the exchange of social 
support. Therefore, it is important for emergency team leaders to be able to cultivate 
amongst members of temporary disaster response work groups the perception that they 
belong to a superordinate group. When disaster responders perceive themselves as 
belonging to a superordinate group, they can become accessible to group members as 
recipients and givers of social support. By augmenting responders’ resilience to critical 
stress, the social support of the temporary team becomes a safety line. When 
circumstances delay or deny responder access to conventional stress interventions, 
through “accelerating” group identification, the emergency team leader will have built 
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